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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
RONALD JOHN MARTINEZ, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE.OF THE CASE 
No. 15744 
This is a criminal proceeding brought by the State 
of Utah against Ronald John Martinez, defendant-appellant, 
charging him with the crime of unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, 
in violation of Section 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on January 31, 1978, after 
a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of the crime of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent 
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to distribute for value. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order of this court reversing 
the judgment rendered at trial and remanding the cause to 
the trial court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, Ronald John Martinez, was charged 
in the information with the unlawful possession of a con-
trolled substance with the intent to distribute for value. 
The trial began on January 30, 1978, in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, before the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder, and concluded on January 31, 1978. 
At trial eight witnesses testified. 
Deputy George testified he first had contact wi~ 
the defendant in a traffic stop on July 18, 1977, at approx· 
imately 3900 South and 900 West (Tr. 13). At that location, 
prior to arrest, Deputy George advised appellant that he had 
a right to remain silent; that anything said could and would 
be used in court; that defendant had a right to an attorney 
during questioning, and that one would be appointed without 
cost; and received defendant's understanding of those rights 
(Tr. 29, 30). Defendant remained silent. 
Deputies Michael George, Stephen Alexander, Randal'. 
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Anderson, the defendant's wife, Sergeant Patiena, Deputy 
Duncan, and Special Deputy Dorothy Akin were present after 
the travel to 1158 Warbler. They conducted a thorough 
search of defendant's residence. Then, after placing the 
defendant under arrest, the interrogation began without a 
fresh set of Miranda warnings. It was only asked of the 
defendant if he remembered his constitutional rights. The 
incriminating statement, "Yeah, I deal dope, but I sold my 
last bag last night," was made by the appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY POLICE OFFICERS 
WHEN APPELLANT HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN HIS 
MIRANDA RIGHTS WHILE UNDER "CUSTODIAL 
INTERROGATION." 
The United States Supreme Court's holding in 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 
2d 694 (1966) is based on the premise that in-custody in-
terrogation creates an inherent compulsion on an individual 
to incriminate himself in response to police questioning. 
Statements obtained under circumstances are, therefore, 
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against compelled testimonial self-incrimination unless the 
privilege is "knowingly and intelligently waived." Id. at 
-3-
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471, 475, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 
The procedural safeguards set forth in Miranda 
are limited to questioning while the defendant is in police 
custody or significantly deprived of his freedom. Again, 
it is this environment which is innately coercive and 
threatens Fifth Amendment constitutional rights. In this 
setting Miranda seeks to protect the defendant from self-
incrimination. 
The prosecution may not use statements 
whether exculpatory or inculpatory 
stemming from custodial interrogation 
of the defendant unless it demonstrates 
the use of procedural safeguards effec-
tive to secure the privilege against 
self-incrimination. Id at 696, 384 
U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966) 
(emphasis added). 
Custodial interrogation was defined by the United 
States Supreme Court in Miranda as: 
Custodial interrogation is question-
ing initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been 
taken into custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action 
in an~ significant way. Id. at 
696, 84 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 
(1966) (emphasis added). 
In the present case, the appellant was alleged~ 
read the Miranda warnings at the location of 3900 South 900 
West, Salt Lake County (Tr. 30). The appellant, however' was 
-4-
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not taken into custody at this time. He was informed that 
the police had a search warrant to search his alleged res-
idence, but the appellant was given the free choice whether 
to return with the police to execute said search warrant or 
to go his own way (Tr. 52). 
The appellant's personal freedom was not restrained 
in any "significant" way. He was free to leave if he so chose 
(Tr. 51, 52). Consequently, the appellant was not under 
"custodial interrogation" when read his rights. The coercive 
environment which Miranda was aimed at controlling was not 
present. 
The appellant was later placed under arrest at the 
location of 1158 Warbler, Salt Lake County (Tr. 30, 31). 
After being taken into custody, he was not given his con-
stitutional rights as required by the United States Supreme 
Court in Miranda. The appellant was subsequently interro-
gated by Officer Michael George. 
Undoubtedly, respondent would argue that since the 
appellant was read his rights prior to arrest, this warning 
would be a sufficient substitute to the requirement that his 
rights be read while in custodial interrogation. Miranda, 
however, does not provide for any form of substitution as to 
the time this warning is to be given. 
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The purpose for Miranda is obvious, i.e. , protectk 
from self-incrimination while under "custodial interrogation. 
To not inform a person of his Fifth Amendment rights at the 
time of interrogation is a flagrant violation of Miranda. 
The Fifth Amendment privilege is 
so fundamental to our system of 
constitutional rule and the ex-
pedient of giving an adequate 
warning as to the availability 
of the privilege so simple, we 
will not pause to inquire in 
individual cases whether defen-
dant was aware of his rights with-
out a warning being given ... 
More important, whatever the 
background of the person interro-
gated a warning at the time of 
the interrogation is indispensable 
to overcome its pressures and to 
insure that the individual knows 
he is free to exercise the privilege 
at that )oint in time. Miranda 
at 720, 84 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 
1602 (1966) (emphasis added). 
Strict compliance with Miranda was upheld by the 
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, in United 
State v. Bensinger, 436 F.2d 576 (1972). In this case 
petitioner, in a writ of habeas corpus proceeding, was advisee 
of his constitutional rights when taken into custody and agail 
about an hour later. Petitioner desired to remain silent. 
Police officers, however, continually confronted him, im-
1 · h · lk · h b f 1 The court heli p oring im to ta in t e a sence o_ counse . 
that evidence obtained as the result of such police action wai 
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not admissible. The court further stated: 
To be effective, those safeguards 
must be fully observed and the 
rights of the suspect must be 
jealously guarded. Not even the 
sli htest circumvention or avoid-
ance mat e to erate . I . at 
578. · ( mphasis added). 
In the case at bar, the trial court relied on Oregon 
v. Mathiason, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977) in overruling defense 
counsel's objection to the admission of statements made by 
appellant while under custodial interrogation, but not having 
been given his Miranda warnings. Taken from the transcript 
in relevant part, the trial court stated: 
and 
. . . as long as an individual 
is in the coercive environment 
where he is in such a restriction 
of his freedom to render him in 
custody, Miranda must be given. 
(Tr. 33). 
I think that having given it to 
him at the site when they first 
talked to him and then again by 
referring back to it would be 
sufficient and would overrule the 
motion. (Tr. 33). 
In Mathiason, the defendant on parole went to the 
police station in response to a request by police officers. 
He was not placed under arrest. Defendant gave a half hour 
interview during which he made a taped confession concerning 
-7-
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his participation in a burglary. The United States Supreme 
Court held that the defendant was not in custody or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of action in any "significant" way 
and, therefore, it was not necessary that he be given the 
Miranda warnings prior to confession. 
The trial court interpreted this case incorrectly. 
The factual situation in Mathiason created a more coercive 
environment than in the present case, however, the United 
States Supreme Court found the defendant was not under cus-
todial interrogation. In Mathiason the defendant was on 
parole. Whether he went to the police station voluntarily, 
as a matter of free choice, is highly suspect. The threat of 
parole violation infringes on a parolee's freedom of movement. 
The interview took place at the police station. The setting 
for the interrogation, therefore, was inherently intimidating. 
In spite of this coercive setting, the United States Supreme 
Court found that the defendant was not under "custodial 
interrogation." 
Following the decision in Mathiason, the trial court 
in the present case erred in concluding that the appellant was 
under custodial interrogation when given the Miranda warning. 
Consequently, the prior warning could not be substituted to 
satisfy the requirements of Miranda. 
-8-
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The constitutional requirements that, as a pre-
requisite to any questioning, an individual held for 
interrogation by a law enforcement officer has a right to 
remain silent does not depend upon whether he is aware of 
his rights without a warning being given. Again, the warnings 
were not given when the appellant was taken into custody. The 
procedural safeguards established in Miranda were not upheld. 
There is no question that the statements obtained 
by police officers in violation of Miranda were prejudicial. 
Officer Michael George interrogated the appellant, and during 
this questioning the appellant allegedly confessed to distrib-
uting a controlled substance. Officer George testified that 
the appellant stated, "Yeah, I deal dope, but I sold my last 
bag last night." (Tr. 35). 
This statement amounts to an alleged confession on 
the part of the appellant to the crime charged. It tends to 
establish his guilt and should not have been admitted into 
evidence in violation of Miranda and his Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination. 
POINT II 
FAILURE TO ADVISE APPELLANT THAT WHILE UNDER 
"CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION" HE COULD CEASE 
MAKING ANY STATEMENT AT ANY TIME WAS A 
VIOLATION OF HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AND 
MIRANDA. 
-9-
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The American accusatory system of criminal justice 
demands that the government seeking to punish an individual 
produce the evidence against him by its own independent labor, 
rather than by the expedient of compelling it from his own 
mouth. The privilege against self-incrimination is accorded 
a liberal construction. The privilege against self-incriminat 
is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard. 
If an individual held for interrogation by police 
indicates in any manner at any time prior to or during ques-
tioning that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation mus: 
cease. An accused who remains silent after being given his 
Miranda warnings signifies his election to remain silent and 
may not thereafter be questioned in any way without proof of 
a clear, intelligent and understanding waiver either declared 
or by conduct of his right to remain silent. 
It has clearly been established that a defendant ha1 
a constitutionally protected right to cut off questioning 
when he has indicated he will not make a statement. ~ 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S., 436, 473-474, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 
2d 694 (1966); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102-106, 46 
L. Ed. 2d 313, 96 S. Ct. 321 (1975). Accordingly, a warning 
of that right should precede custodial interrogation. 
State v. Workmen, 435 P.2d 919, reversed per curiam 
-10-
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21 L. Ed. 2d 20 dealt with the warning to an accused of his 
right to have an appointed counsel present during custodial 
interrogation. By analogy, the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution right against self-incrimination and 
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah should 
compel a warning of the constitutional right to cut off 
questioning as a necessity for fair procedure to protect the 
broad base of protected silence under the constitutions. 
For without a prior warning of the privilege to 
control the interrogation as a balance against the coercive 
custodial environment, the accused remains ignorant of this 
important constitutionally protected privilege to cut off 
questioning. It is submitted that this right is not scrup-
ulously honored as mandated by the United States Supreme 
Court in the Mosley case unless a procedural protective 
warning containing that right is given to the accused prior 
to interrogation. 
Mosley also implies by its holding that a fresh 
set of warnings be given after a significant time lapse 
betwen interrogations. 
Miranda warning cards customarily carried by police 
officers to be read to suspects preceding custodial interro-
gation state: 
-11-
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1. You have the right to remain silent. 
2. Anything you say can and will be used 
against you in a court of law. 
3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer 
and have him present with you while you 
are being questioned. 
4. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer 
one will be appointed to represent you 
before you answer questions, if you 
wish. 
S. If you wish to answer questions now 
without contacting a lawyer or without 
a lawyer present, you have the right to 
stop answering questions at any time. 
Appellant's constitutional right to stop answering 
questions was omitted in violation of Miranda and his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the police did not warn the accused of his 
constitutional rights to cut off questioning and because his 
silence was not scrupulously honored during custodial interro· 
gation, all incriminating statements made by him were inad-
missible and should have been suppressed. 
-12-
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This case should be reversed, or, in the alternative, 
the appellant should be granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSEN AND HANSEN 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
By~fit \ tJZi 1· P i L.ansen 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant were served on Robert B. Hansen, Utah State 
Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this ~~~~day of November, 1978. 
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